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INTRODUCTION
Background
Effective task management requires that cockpit tasks be priorit_ed correctly, executed
in a timely manner, and allocated between the crew so that no one is overloaded. Effective
task management has been a challenge for crews of both traditional and automated aircraft.
It became a focus of concern when poor task management was implicated in several
accidents and incidents in Part 121 air career operations (Chou, Madhavan, and Funk, 1996).
In response to these concerns, several government laboratories initiated research efforts to
understand how air carrier pilots perform task management (Funk, 1991; Latorellat, 1966:
Rogers, 1996; Schutte and Trujillo, 1996).
These efforts have identified task priodtizatJon as a critical component of effective task
management. However, determining task pdodtization in a two-person, automated aircraft is
problematic. The environment is dynamic, changing frequently. Task assignments between
pilots may change depending on the circumstances. Time constraints may dictate that some
tasks be rescheduled, interleaved with other tasks, or omitted entirely, making it difficult to
identify the relative pdority of tasks at a given point in time. Additionally. collecting data during
operational flying is difficult because of safety and operational considerations_
Consequently, most attempts to identify task pfforities have been conducted using
techniques that range frem structured interviews (Rogers, 1996) to medium-fidelity simulations
(Latorellat, 1996; Schutte and Truijillo, 1996). Some of these techniques ask the pilots about
their task priorities in specific situations; others infer priorities from the order of task execution.
The study reported in this paper takes a different approach to identifying task priorities. This
study used interruptions to infer relative task priorities by assuming that if an ongoing task was
interrupted by the arrival of a new task, then the new task had the higher priority. This
research also used video tapes of Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenarios as the data
source, ensuring high realism.
Describing interrupted activities and stimuli that h_ve the potential to interrupt ongoing
activities can lead to considerable confusion. Consequently, throughout the _mainder of this
document, "events" will refer to stimuli with the potential to interrupt ongoing activities. An
activityis said to be interrupted only when it has stopped. Similarly, an interruption occurs
when an event causes an activity to stop.
Purpose
The pdmary purpose of this study was to determine the relative priorities of various
events and activities by examining the probab=T_y that a given activity was interrupted by a
given event. The analysis will begin by providing frequency of interruption data by crew
position (captain versus first officer) and event type. Any differences in the pattern of
interruptions between the first officers and the captains w_ll be explored and interpreted in
terms of standard operating procedures.
Subsequent data analyses will focus on comparing the frequency of interruptions for
different types of activities and for the same activities under normal versus emergency
conditions. Briefings and checklists will receive particular attention. The frequency with which
specific activities are interrupted under multiple- versus single-task conditions also will be
examined: because the majority of multiple-task data were obtained under laborato_
conditions, LOFT-type tapes offer a unique opportunity to examine concurrent task
performance under "real-world" conditions.
A second purpose of this study is to examine the effects of the interruptions on
performance. More specifically, when possible, the time to resume specific activities will be
compared to determine if pilots are slower to resume certain types o1'activities. Errors in
resumption or failures to resume specific activities will be noted and any patterns in these
errors will be identified. Again, particular attention will be given to the effects of interruptions
on the completion of checklists and briefings. Other types of errors and missed events (i.e., the
crew should have responded to the event but did not) will be examined.
Any methodology using interruptions to examine task priodtization must be able to
identify when an interruption has occurred and describe the ongoing activities that were
interrupted. Both of these methodological problems are discussed in detail in the following
section.
APPROACH
The major methodological obstacle to studying intemjptions concerns determining
when an interruption has occurred. Identifying an interruption in some situations is
straightforward, i.e. a pilot stops talking in midsentence. Most situations are not as obvious,
however. Several different methods for identifying interruptions were tried, including time-
based techniques that examined changes in ac_vities for fixed periods after an event. The
most promising of these methods, which was subsequently adopted, uses the resumption of
an activity as the primary criterion for an interruption, Le., if the pilot resumed the activity, it
was scored as having been interrupted. If the pilot did not resume the activity, the investigator
had to distinguish among four altematives: the activity was completed before the event was
addressed, the activity was not completed but was no longer relevant, the activity was
unimportant and did not need to be resumed (i.e., casual conversation), and the activity should
have been resLmned but was not. Cleady, distinguishing between these four alternatives is the
most problematic aspect of this approach.
Expectancy was a secondary cdtedon for determining if an activity had been
interrupted. An expected event was assumed not to cause as an interruption. For example, if
a pilot contacted air tTaffic control (ATC) for information and was told to stand by. the
subsequent ATC Call was assumed not to interrupt any of that pilot's ongoing activities.
The time to resume an interrupted task (resumption t/me) was used, when possible, as
a secondary measure of priority. That is. resumption time was used to confirm estimates of
priorities. For example, if an activity was rarely interrupted and resumed quickly after the
interruption, then the resumption time measure supported an inference of high pdority for the
activity.
The second major methodological issue in studying interruptions concerns the
systematic classification and description of the pilots' tasks. Because flying has been
conceptualized as a hierarchy of goals and tasks since at least 1947 (Williams. 1971), a task
analysis is an appropriate tool for describing the pilots' activities in a systematic manner. A
generic task analysis developed by the FAA for automated aircraft was used in this study
(Longddge, 1995). This task analysis had six levels of activities, which was sufficient to
provided a comprehensive analysis of the pilot's tasks. Because the task analysis was
generic, it couldbe usedfor differentautomatedaincfaftand,withvery minormodifications,for
differentair carders.
The effectsof interruptionson two levelsof the pilot'sactivitieswere examined.Thefirst
levelwill be referred to as the e/ement level. Elements generally consist of fine-grained
activities that are easily defined and observed, e.g., read, manipulate, talk. The only exception
to this are the two elements that represent periods of unobservable activity--listen and
monRor.
The second level of activity (second-level activity) usually was the lowest level activity
represented in file task analysis and was coded using its numerical designation. Examples of
second-level acthn'_es are "Perform after takeoff checklist," "Select approach mode on mode
control panel (MCP)," and "Select legs page." Generally, idenlJfying and coding second-level
activities was straightforward. The only two exceptions occurred when the pilots were
monitoring the instruments or programming the systems. When the pilots appeared to be
monitoring the instruments, it was frequently impossible to identify the second-level activity. In
these cases, one of the higher levels of the task analysis, such as "Perform enroute cruise,"
was used as the second-level activity.
Programming the flight management computer (FMC) presented special coding problems.
The pilots could be observed typing information into the FMC. However, because the video
cameras were placed behind the pilots, none of the videos were clear enough to allow the
displays to be read. Thus, the investigator could not determine precisely what step of the
programming tasks the pilot was performing. In these cases, the investigator again used one
of the higher levels of the task analysis to describe the pilot's second-level activity.
Some questions may be raised about the usefulness of the element data. This level of
activity was recorded and analyzed for four reasons. First, no data had been collected at this
level of detail when the study began. Thus, such data could be a valuable resource,
particularly for investigators developing models of crew performance. Second, as noted earlier,
task prioritization is a difficult topic to investigate. Fine-grained behaviors appeared to be more
tractable to understanding and analysis than high-level cognitive tasks. Third,
recommendations from a study focused on fine-grained behaviors may be more easily
implemented in air carrier training curricula than recommendations concerning high-level tasks.
Fourth, subsequent reseaf'ch will be concerned with the interruption of high-level tasks.
METHODS
Scenarios
The video tapes were obtained from three different sources. Each source used a
different scenario. One scenario included a fuel management problem at cruise that was not
covered by any procedure. Additionally, the crew was required to execute a missed approach,
which was followed by a side-step maneuver during the second approach. The second
scenario involved a critical passenger illness that required a dwersion to an airport where the
weather was at minimums. The third scenario involved a smell of undetermined origin that
required a return to the departure point.
ATC, support personnel (dispatch, ramp, etc.), and flight attendants were simulated in
different ways in the three scenarios. In the first scenario, retired air traffic controllers
performed ATC functions while other confederates role played support personnel and flight
attendants. In the second scenario, the LOFT instructor role played all of the personnel. In the
third scenario, the LOFT instructor role played all personnel except ATC, which was simulated
by an intern. None of the simulators were equipped with data rink. Consequently, all
communications between the pilots and ATC or support personnel were conducted using
standard radio procedures.
The scenarios were performed in full-motion, Level C or 13simulators. Each scenario
involved a different model aircraft. All of the aircraft were produced by the same manufacturer
and are considered "glass cockpit" aircraft. None of the scenarios was modified in any form for
this study.
Participants
The data were obtained from 11 flight crews from three different air carders. All crews
consisted of line-qualified, current captains and first officers. All crews used the operating
procedures and manuals' of their own aidine. The crews flew simulators of aircraft in which
they were currently qualified. None of the crew members were instructors or management
pilots. In ten of the crews, the captain was the pilot flying, in the 11u' crew, the first Officer was
the pilot flying. 13ata frobm this crew was included in this study only after they were inspected to
ensure that thye did not differ from the others.
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Task Analysis
Few modifications to the FAA task analysis were necessafy for this study. The few
omissions that were noted usually involved procedural differences between the air canJers.
For example, dudng an emergency some air carriers require the crew to execute a cheddist as
well as perform certain procedures from memory, whereas the FAA task analysis only included
the procedures executed from memory. Thus, the task analysis omitted tasks for some air
carriers. In such cases, an additional item was added to the task analysis at the appropriate
point. Occasionally, a step was out of place for a given air carder and simply was added at the
appropriate point in the task analysis.
Scoring
Before the data could be scored, several arbitrary decisions were necessary. The first
concerned the type of elements that could be interrupted. Much of commercial aidine flying
involves cognitive, rather than physical, tasks. These tasks_such as monitoring instruments,
planning approaches, and listening to the other p_ot---are unobservable. Their execution,
consequently, must be infen'ed from other behaviors and information sources. The investigator
decided that no =unobservable" elements would be scored as interrupted although they were
recorded, i.e. a pilot's element might be recorded as "monitoring" at the time of an event, but
no interruption would be scored.
The second arbitrary decision concerned identifying the time at which an event
occurred. For visual and auditory warning signals, such identification is straightforward; these
signals have a clear onset. Other types of events, however, do not have such a clear onset.
For ATC calls, scoring began at the end of the call sign because some of the scenarios
included ATC communications with other aircraft. For events involving the entry of the flight
attendant into the cockpit, scoring began when the flight attendant began talking because the
individual role playing the flight attendant never simulated using a key to enter the cockpit and
frequently did not knock to enter the cockpit.
Seventeen elements were used to reflect the behaviors that were occurring at the time
of the event (see Table 1). Second-level activities were represented using the numeric codes
from the task analysis.
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TABLE 1. UST OF ELEMENTS USED TO CODE THE DATA
Element
arrange pause
don .... point
fly reach ......
inp.ut .. read .
laugh scan ....
listen talk
manipulate tune
monitor write
move
Each video tape was examined for six types of events from the V,(rotate speed) call to
touchdown. These events were ATC calls, cabin chimes, appearance of the flight attendant,
voice communications from the flight attendant, communications from support personnel, and
auditory and visual warning signals. When an event was identified, 17 variables associated
with it were encoded. Among the variables encoded were the time at which the event
occurred, the time at which a pilot responded to the event, who responded, the type of event,
the elements (see Table 2), and the second-level activities that were in progress for each pilot
at the time of the evenL The investigator determined if any of the elements or second-level
activities were actually interrupted and, if so, the time at which they were resumed. If a
second-level activity was resumed, the investigator also determined if it was resumed at the
correct point by consulting the appropriate checklists and procedures.
The scoring allowed for concurrent performance of elements. For example, a pilot
could be reaching for a chart while talking. In such cases, the effect of the event on each
element was noted and scored separately. The scodng also allowed for concurrent
performance of second-level activities although such instances were rare. Again, the effect of
the event on each activity was noted and scored separately.
On occasion the investigator could not identify the second-level activity in progress at
the time of the event. In these situations, the investigator consulted a subject matter expert.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Because two of the techniques used to analyze the frequency data--Iogit (muffi-way
frequency) analysis and logistic regression--are relatively new, some discussion of their
characteristics and limitations is appropriate. Logit analysis is an extension of the traditional
two-way 7_z test of independence to multiple categorical variables in which one is considered to
be a dependent variable and the others are considered to be predictors. In logistic regression
analysis, the dependent variable is categorical and the predictors may be either categorical or
continuous.
Logit analysis has the advantage of permitting tests of the interactions among
predictors as well of their individual effects on the dependent variable. However, Iogit analysis
looses its sens_vity to reliable effects when the expected cell frequencies are insufficient.
Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood methods that will fail to converge on a solution
when the cell frequencies are too low or too discrepant (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996).
However, a form of logistic regression, conditional exact inference, sometimes provides a
solution when the cell frequencies are low or discrepant Thus. whenever expected cell
frequencies were sufficient to permit sensitive prediction of interruptions, a logit analysis was
used. If the cell frequencies were not sufficient, the conditional exact form of logistic
regression analysis was used.
Regardless of the technique used, the captains' and the first officers' data were always
analyzed separately. Separate analyses avoided dependencies in the data caused by having
the same event represented in both data sets. For the same reason, analyses of elements
were always c_nducted separately from analyses of second-level activities.
All of the analyses reported in this section are concerned with frequencies of
interruptions. To determine if some types of elements have a significantly greater probab_ity
of being interrupted than others, the event was the unit of observation and was assumed to
occur randomly relative to the elements being performed by the crew. Although this
assumption may appear to be questionable, for five of the crews, the person generating the
events could not see the pilots. For the other crews, the simulator instructors agreed to
generate the events b,_sed on the position of the aircraft (i.e., ATC calls), not on the activities
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of the pilots. Theassumptionof independence,therefore,seemstenable.The same
assumption was made for second-level activities.
Summary Data
A total of 324 events were scored. The overall frequency of each type of event is given
in Table 2. One event was incorrectly recorded and is not shown in Table 2. In some cases
the number of elements may exceed the number of events. In these cases, the pilot was
performing two elements when an event arrived. The number of second-level activities also
may exceed the number of events for the same reason. This table also gives the average time
to respond to the event, which was calculated from the onset of the event to the beginning of
the reply for the first five event types. Response time for the auto throttle disconnect warning
was calculated from the onset of the signal to the time the pilot moved the auto throttle arm
switch.
The data presented in Table 2 should be interpreted with caution for several reasons.
Some of the events, particularly those generated by support personnel, are very infrequent.
Any inferences about the probability of interruption should be made with extreme caution. The
data pertaining to the appearance of the flight attendant and direct voice communication with
the pilots may be particularly unrepresentative; the door between the pilots and the cabin crew
normally is dosed and locked during flight in all three of the s|mulated aircraft_ Thus, the flight
attendant could not appear in the cockpit without using a key or without knocking and having
the pilots release the door. Additionally, a direct call from the cabin attendants to the pilots is
not normally possible in any of the three aircraft included in this study; the flight attendant must
ring the cabin chime to signal the crew to switch to the interphone mike.
Table 2 indicates that, for most events, the probability of interruption of a second-level
activity is equal to or greater than the corresponding probability for an element. These results
may reflect, however, an artifact of using a task analysis to structure the pilots' activities.
Within this structure, a pilot must interrupt some level of activity to respond to an event.
Because only two levels of activities were analyzed, the second-level activity was scored as
interrupted if the element was not dearly interrupted and the pilot resumed either the element
or the second-level activity. Thus, the higher frequency of interruptions for second-level
activities may reflect a scoring artifact.
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TABLE2. PROBABILITYOFINTERRUPTIONBYEVENT
Event
Type
Freq. Average
Resp.
Time_
275 6
C.apL
Element
(prob.)
ATC .163
(47/288) 3
Flight
Attendant
Chime
Appears
Voice 4
suppo.a
Dispatch
Ground
Support
Systems
Main.
ARINC
20 14 .095
_1)
11 10 .091
(1Ill)
2 13 0
..... (0/2)
11 8
1
1
1
1Auto
Throttle
Disconn.
.333
(4/12)
4 0
(o/1)
27 1.00
..... (111)
3 0
(0/1)
5 1.00
(1/1)
Cape
Second
Level
_orob.)
.305
(84/27S)
.286
(Sql).
.818
(9/11 )
0
(0/2)
.727
(8/11)
0
(o/1)
1.00
(1/1)
1.00
(1/1)
1.00
(1/1)
F.O. 2
Element
(prob.)
.177
_ (57/281 )
.190
(4/21)
.083
(1/12)
0
(0/'2)
.250
¢U12)
0
(011)
0
(o/1)
0
(0/1)
1.00
(111)
.dQ 2" ' '
Second
Level
(prob.)
.402
(111/276)
.550
(11/2o)
0
(0/11)
0
(0/2)
.636
(7/11)
1.00
(1/1)
0
(011)
0
(o/1)
1.00
(1/1)
Response lJrnesare rounded to the nearest second
*_First Officer
3Denominators greater than the frequency of the event reflect concurrent elements or second-
level activities. An event could interruptone, both, or none of the concurrent elements or
concurrent activ_es.
• Talking directly to the pilotswithout use of the interphone
Despite these caveats, several trends are evident in the data. First, events interrupt
ongoing elements relatively infrequently for both the captain and the first officer. This result
will be discussed in more detail in the following section. Second, events generated by the
flight attendants appear to have a low probability of interrupting either the ongoing elements or
the second-level activities of either pilot. Additionally, pilots are slow to respond to flight
attendant events, confirming their low priority. Third. pilots respond promptly to ATC, which is
in keeping with operational practice. Indeed, the true response time is actually shorter than
given in Table 2 because, as noted earlier, the response time S_own was measured from the
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end of the call sign.not from the end of the message. Fourth, ATC calls appear to be more
likely to interrupt the second-level activities of first officers than captains. This result was
anticipated because 10 of the 11 first officers were the pilot not flying in the scenario and.
consequent]y, were responsible for radio calls_
Interruption of Elements
A major goal of this study was to determine if the frequency of interrupt]on differed
between elements for the same evenL Because the frequency of interruption for a given
element may differ under normal versus emergency conditions, the frequency should be
compared between these two conditions. Fortunately, because all three scenarios involved
emergencies, a sufficient number of events occun'ed while the captain and the first officer
were performing emergency procedures to allow such a comparison.
The task analysis used to code the second-level activities had a group of numeric
codes for emergencies. Activities that were performed during normal operations, such as
copying ATIS (x"lowering the gear during an approach, were not included in the emergency
numenc codes. An event, therefore, could occur when one pilot was performing under
emergency conditions while the other appeared to be performing under normal conditions.
Clearly, however, both pilots actually were working under emergency conditions. To avoid
misleading results, all analyses counted elements and second-level activities as performed
under emergency conditions if one or both pilots were operating under emergency conditions
as indicated by the numeric codes of the task analysis.
As shown in Table 2, only ATC calls were sufficiently frequent for analysis. Table 3
shows the frequency of interruption for the most common elements under both normal and
emergency conditions. Logistic regression techniques were used to analyze the probability of
interruptions as a function of element type and condition (emergency versus normal).
However, to avoid statistical problems from low cell frequencies, some of the elements had to
be grouped. Consequently, the movement elements (move, reach, point) were combined into a
movement group, as were the manipulation elements when the manipulated object was part of
the automated flight system (electronic manipulation group). Thus, element type had six
levels: movement group, electronic manipulation group, talk, input, write, and read.
Despite grouping some of the elements, the maximum likelihood methods would not
converge because of the small cell frequencies. Therefore, conditional exact inference on the
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parametersof the logisticregression model were conducted using LogXact-Turbo software
(Cytel, 1993), which offers an exact concrdional scores test, dis_buted as Z2.
TABLE 3. FREQUENCY OF ATC INTERRUPTIONS FOR SELECTED ELEMENTS
Element
Fly
Talk
Move
Reach
Point
Read
Captain
Emergency t
Write
Input to C.DU 0/1
Manipulate
MCP altitude 0/0
MCP 0/0-
autopilot
MCP heading 0/1
select
0/0
0/0
2/6
0/1
0/0
0/0
0/6
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Normal
o/4s=
First Officer
Emergency I
0/0
28/54 3/4
0/3 0t2
115 0/0
010 0/0
1/1 2/5
MCP speed
MCP. heading
MCP
(general) 3
Center CDU"
1/1
2/7 011
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0 0/0
0/13 0/0
0/1 0/0
1/7 0/0
o/o '6/1
Normal
0/1
10/26
1/5
0/3
0/1
11/13
O/3
14/'22
0/1
1/3
0/1
111
0/2
0/1
IEmergency conditions were defined using the task analysis. The entries in this column
were obtained when one or both pilots were operating under emergency conditions.
=The denominator represents the frequency of this element in the database. The
numerator represents the number of times an ATC call interrupted the elemenL
>l'his classification was used when the investigator could not identify the counter or knob
being manipulated by the pilot.
A model including both element type and condition significantly predicted interruptions
among captains, ;C=(5, N = 94) = 15.44, p < .01. However, within the model, only element type
significantly affected interruptions, 7.2 (5, N = 94) = 10.91, p = .03; there was no significant
effect of emergency versus normal conditions, p = .14. The same pattern of results was
observed for first officers, with the two component model significanUy predicting intemJptions,
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Z=(5, N - 97) = 26.54, p < .01. Type of element was a significant predictor, Z2 (5. N = 97) =
26.27, p < .01; but condition was not, p = .73, p < .01.
These results indicate that the probability that an ATC call will interrupt any of the six
element types does not differ between normal and emergency conditions. This is somewhat
surprising given the urgency of many emergencies. That is, elements performed under
emergency conditions might be assumed to have a higher priority and, therefore, a lower
probability of interruption than elements performed under normal conditions. These data do
not support such an assumption.
Post hoe comparisons were made among elements using the conditional scores test
with data collapsed over condition. The large number of potential post hoc comparisons
precJuded an exhaustive determination of the source of the difference, and casual inspection
of the data gave little hint of the source of the difference for either pilot_ Consequently,
Wickens' Multiple Resource Theory (1992) was used to guide the selection of comparisons to
be tested. According to this theory, the maximum interference between two tasks occurs when
they assess the same types of processing resources. Thus, an ATC call, which accesses
verbal resources, should interfere most with a verbal task and, presumably, have the highest
probability of causing an interruption. The probability of interruption should be lower for tasks
that access other types of resources, such as spatial resources. Because these data were
based on interruptions from ATC calls, contrasting a verbal activity (talking) with more manual
activities (movement, input, electronic manipulation) seemed appropriate.
The Type I error rate was set to .0125 to adjust the family-wise error rate for the four
comparisons, in which "talk" was contrasted with all other elements except "read" (another
verbal activity). None of the comparisons for captains nor for the first officers were statistically
reliable using the Bonferroni-type correction. Thus, at this time it is impossible to determine
which element types differ significantly in ten'ns of their likelihood of interruption.
One important element, fly, was not included in the logistic regression analysis because
of its unique status, i.e. hand flying typically occurs under "sterile cockpit" conditions or under
emergency conditions. Table 3 shows that 48 events occurred while the captain was flying.
None interrupted flying. Because the captain was the pilot flying in 10 of the 11 crews, only
one event occurred while a first officer was flying and, again, this event did not intemJpt flying.
The results of this study correspond exactly to the anticipated results and reflect
standard operating procedures. In Part 121 Air Carder operations, one pilot is cJeady
lb
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designatedas the pilot flying. When this pilot is hand flying the aircraft, the other pilot
assumes essentially all other duties. ThuS, no interruptions of flying should occur.
Concurrent Element Performance
Concurrent performance of elements is a relatively rare occurrence. Of the 324 events
recorded in this study, 14 occurred v,_en the captain was performing two elements under
normal conditions and one under emergency conditions. The corresponding numbers for the
first officer are seven and two. A logit (multi-way frequency) analysis was performed to
determine if elements performed concurrently were more likely to be interrupted than elements
performed alone. Because the probability of interruption may vary between normal and
emergency conditions, two factors were included in the Iogit analysis: number of elements
performed (one versus two) and condition (emergency versus normal).
Neither number of elements nor condition individually predicted interruptions for first
officers, p = .71 and .96, respectively. However, number of elements and condition interacted
in their effect on interruptions, ;{.z(1, N = 326) = 3.89, p< .05. When the first officer was
performing two elements concurrently, 50% of the elements were interrupted under emergency
conditions and about 7% under normal conditions. However, when the first officer was
performing a single element, 16% of the elements were interrupted under emergency
conditions and 21% were interrupted under normal conditions. An analogous analysis for
captains showed no reliable prediction of interruptions by number of tasks Co= 70), cond_on
(p = .65), nor their interaction Co= .36).
The results of these analyses indicate that concurrent elements are no more likely to be
interrupted than single elements (see Table 2) except under emergency conditions for first
officers. The lack of a condition effect is difficult to explain; concurrent element performance
under emergency conditions should reflect high workload or high stress. Under such
conditions, events should be less likely to interrupt concurrent elements. The interaction
demonstrated by the first officers' data appears particularly anomalous.
The effects of an event on concurrent element performance, however, may not be
limited to the elements themselves. When a pilot is performing two elements concurrently, the
second-level activity may be more likely to be interrupted than when the pilot is performing
one element_ Interestingly, visual inspection of the data revealed that under normal conditions,
pilots who were performing two elements concurrently at the time of an event were never
performin} two second-level activities concurrently. In contrast, under emergency conditions,
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designatedasthe pgotflying. When this pilot is hand flying the aircraft, the other pilot
assumes essentially all other duties. Thus, no intemJptions of flying should occur.
Concurrent E/ement Performance
Concurrent performance of elements is a relatively rare occurrence. Of the 324 events
recorded in this study, 14 occurred w_en the captain was performing two elements under
normal conditions and one under emergency conditions. The corresponding numbers for the
first officer are seven and two. A Iogit (multi-way frequency) analysis was performed to
determine if elements performed concurrently were more likely to be interrupted than elements
performed alone. Because the probability of interruption may vary between normal and
emergency conditions, two factors were included in the Iogit analysis: number of elements
performed (one versus two) and condition (emergency versus normal).
Neither number of elements nor condition individually predicted interruptions for first
officers, p = .71 and .96, respectively. However, number of elements and condition interacted
in their effect on interruptions, X=(1, N = 326) = 3.89, p< .05. When the first officer was
performing two elements concurrently, 50% of the elements were interrupted under emergency
conditions and about 7% under normal conditions. However, when the first officer was
performing a single element, 16% of the elements were interrupted under emergency
condi'dons and 21% were interrupted under normal conditions. An analogous analysis for
captains showed no reliable prediction of interruptions by number of tasks Co= 70), condition
Co= .65), nor their interaction (p = .36).
The results of these analyses indicate that concurrent elements are no more likely to be
interrupted than single elements (see Table 2) except under emergency conditions for first
officers. The lack of a condition effect is difficult to explain; concurrent element performance
under emergency conditions should reflect high workload or high stress. Under such
conditions, events should be less likely to interrupt concurrent elements. The interaction
demonstrated by the first officers' data appears pa_culady anomalous.
The effects of an event on concurrent element performance, however, may not be
limited to the elements themselves. When a pilot is performing two elements concurrently, the
second-level activity may be more likely to be interrupted than when the pilot is performing
one element. Interestingly, visual inspection of the data revealed that under normal conditions,
pilots who were performing two elements concurrently at the time of an event were never
performing two second-level activities concurrently. In contrast, under emergency conditions,
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two of the three instances of concurrent element performance were associated with concurrent
second-level activities. With no concurrent second-level activities under normal condiSons,
analyzing the data from both conditions in one analysis would have been problematic because
of the low cell frequencies. Consequently, only data obtained under normal conditions were
included in the analysis.
A ;C=test of independence was performed for second-level activities. The test had two
factors---number of elements (one versus two) and effect of the event (interruption versus no
interruption) on the second-level activity. Neither the test performed on the captains' data nor
the test performed on the first officers' data showed an effect of number of elements
performed at the time of the event on the probabifity of an interruption of the second-level
activity.
Interruption of Second-Level Activities
Only a few of the large number of questions that can be asked about second-level
activities will be addressed in this report. This section will be concerned with the likelihood that
second-level activities other than briefings and checklists will be interrupted. Briefings and
checklists will be addressed in the following section.
Some of the most serious human factors issues in aviation today concern the types of
errors that can occur in automated as compared to traditional cockpits (Wiener and Curry,
1980). Interruption of ongoing elements and second-level activities is one way in which errors
may be introduCed into the system. Although no data were obtained from traditional cockpits,
activities that are common to both traditional and automated cockpits may be compared with
activities that are unique to automated cockpits.
ConsequentJy, selected second-level activities for normal operating conditions were
combined into groups for the purpose of analysis. The first group consisted of procedural and
"housekeeping" activities that are common to both traditional and automated aircraft_ These
activities included those found in climbing to cruise altitude (e.g., turning the landing lights off,
setting the altimeter to 29.92" passing 18,000 ft, observing airspeed restrictions, etc.) and
those used to configure the aircraft systems enroute (e.g., adjusting the cabin temperature,
setting the anti-ice system, monitoring the warning lights, gauges, and messages, etc.). The
second group consisted of crew communication and situational awareness activities that again
are common to both traditional and automated cockpits. Examples are communicating with the
cabin crew about turbulence, discussing weather cha_ges, maintaining terrain awareness, and
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assessingde-icingrequirements.The thirdgroupwasuniqueto automatedaircraftand
consistedof operatingand programmingthe FMS(seeTable4).
The X2 test of independence examined interruptions as a function of second-level
activity group (procedural/housekeeping, crew communication and situational awareness, and
operate/program the FMS) for normal operations only. Group did not predict interruptions for
captains Co= .17), but was a significant predictor for first officers, 3Cz (2, N = 84) = 8.06. p < .05.
Ryan's post hoc procedure (Ryan, 1960) examined pairwise differences among the three
groups. Only the ddference between the operate/program the FMS group and the
procedural/housekeeping group significantly predicted interruptions for first officers. ;Cz (1, N.N_=
58) = 7.82, p < .05.
TABLE 4. PROBABILITY OF INTERRUPTION OF THREE
SECOND4.EVEL ACT1VrI1ES UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
Captain Finst Officer
i
ProceduraL/ 9/29 12/26
Housekeeping
Crew Commun.
And Situational
Awareness
17/14 17114
Operate/Progntm 7117 26/32
FMS
Visual inspection of the data indicates that the first officer is roughly twice as likely to be
interrupted during opearte/program activities as during procedural and housekeeping activities.
Two factors may account for this difference. First, programming tasks frequently are relatively
long, whereas procedural and housekeeping tasks are brief. Programming tasks, therefore,
have a larger window of opportunity for interruption than housekeeping and procedural tasks.
Second, the computer processors of most aircraft are extremely slow and require significant
amounts of time to execute many functions. While waiting for a command to execute, a pilot
may "leave" the operate/program activity to perform other activities.
The high interruption rate may indicate that operate/program activities have large
"windows of opportunity" for errors. The opportunity for error may be increased further by the
fact that the majority of interruptions are caused by ATC calls. Much of the information
*contained in these calls is numeric with a format similar to that being programmed. Thus, the
"IQ
possibility of entering the wrong information after resuming the task appears to be relatively
high.
The time at which a specific activity was interrupted was not recorded. However, the
time at which the pilot responded to the event can be used as an approximation to the
interruption time. The time at which the interrupted task was resumed was always recorded.
The difference between these two is referred to as the "resumption time" and approximates
the "true" resumption time (the difference between the time at which the pilot stopped an
activity and the time at which he resumed it). The calculated resumption time should be less
than or equal to the true resumption time.
Occasionally, an event interrupted a pgot's ongoing element or second-level activity
although the pilot did not respond to the event (i.e., he did not answer the ATC
communication). Such situations were included in the calculation of the resumption time for the
pilot and were calculated from the response time of the other piloL Again, this procedure
probably underestimates the resumption time: the pilot probably interrupted his element or
act_ity before the other pilot made a response. Resumption times, therefore, should be
considered only as indications of the time to resume a task.
The median time to resume the housekeeping/procedural second-level activities was
10 s. The median resumption time for the operate/program activities was 14 s. However. the
range of scores differed considerable. For housekeeping activities, resumption scores ranged
from 3 s to 39 s; the range for operate/program activities was 2 s to 1084 s.
Interruption of Second-Level Activities--Briefings and Checklists
From an operational perspective, the interruption of briefings and checklists, particularly
under emergency conditions, poses hazards to the safety of flight. A sufficient number of
intemJptions of both of these activities under normal and emergency conditions occun'ed in the
video tapes to alow an analysis of both briefings and checklists (see Table 5). In the majority
of instances, both the captain and the first officer were performing the same activity (briefing or
checklist). Occasionally, other activities were interleaved if an omission were noted during the
briefing or checklist. For example, during the instrument approach briefing, one pilot might
realize that the missed approach procedure had not been entered into the computer and
"leave" the briefing to program the missed approach. In such instances, an event could only
interrupt the briefing of the pilot who was not programming.
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Threetypesof briefingsoccurredunderboth normal and emergency conditions: initial
descent briefings, instrument approach procedures bnefings, and approach/landing briefings.
For the purposes of the analysis, these were combined into one group. If these briefings
occurred when one or both of the crew were operating under emergency cond'dions, they were
scored as emergency briefings and combined with other bdefings that occurred only under
emergency conditions. Table 5 shows the frequency of interruptions for briefings under both
normal and emergency conditions.
TABLE S. PROBABILITY OF INTERRUPTION OF BRIEFINGS AND CHECKUSTS
UNDER NORMAL VERSUS EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
Briefing
Checkl'LSt
Captain First Officer
Normal Emergency _ Normal Emergency +
.800 (16r2o} .750 (314,) .765 (1.3/17) .000 (0/3)
.500 (6t12).. .100 (1110) .765 (13117) .500 (1/2)
+Emergency conditionswere defined usingthe task analysis. The entries in this column were
obtained when one or both pilotswere operating under emergency conditions.
Interruptions during briefings were analyzed using the exact conditional scores test.
Emergency versus normal conditions did not predict interruptions for captains Co= .12), but
first officers were about 9.5 times more likely to be interrupted during normal than emergency
conditions, Z=(1, N = 20) = 6.23, p = .03, 13= 2.254.
The average time for the captain to resume the interrupted briefing was 33 s; the
corresponding time for the first officer was 26 s. Because briefings are somewhat
unstructured, it is difficult to determine if information subsequently was omitted. Nevertheless,
the investigator found no evidence that information was omitted from an inten'upted briefing.
Three types of checklists were performed in the scenarios: the after takeoff checklist,
the approach/descent checklist, and the before landing checklist. For the purposes of the
analyses, data from the three checklists were combined. Data on checklist interruptions are
given in Table 5. Interruptions during checklists also were analyzed using the exact conditional
scores test. Emergency versus normal conditions did not predict interruptions during
checklists for captains Co = .12) or first officers Co> .99).
The average time to resume an interrupted checklist was 26 s for captains. The first
officers required an average of 24 s to resurge a checklisL The interruptions did not cause the
?t3
captains to miss any steps although two captains repeated the immediately preceding step
when they resumed the checklist. The first officers did not miss any steps when they resumed
the checklist nor did they repeat any steps. However, one before landing checklist was never
resumed because, by the time the first officer completed the interrupting event, he was too far
behind the aircraft to complete the checklist before the aircraft landed.
On the whole, these analyses support most assumptions about pilot performance under
emergency conditions. Pilots concentrate on the most important tasks, which are executing
the emergency checklists and briefings.
Failures To Resume The Second-Level Activity
Other than the examples given above, the data provide r,'tt]e evidence that pnots fail to
resume second-level activities that are interrupted. Only three instances were found in which
the captain failed to resume a second-level activity, all of which occurred after an ATC call. In
all cases the second-level activity involved talking. In three instances the first officer failed to
resume a second-level activity after an ATC call. One of these activities involved talking about
the fuel status of the aircraft. In no case did the failure to resume the second-level activity
result in any observable errors or problems.
Concurrent Second-Level Activities
Concurrent second-level activities were rare. Only one instance was found for a
captain and one for a first officer. Both of these occurred under emergency conditions, and
both occurred when the pilot was performing two elements concurrently. Neither the captain
nor the first officer interrupted either second-level activity to respond to the event.
Missed Events
Missed events, particularly ATC calls, are a concern for flight crews. Inspection of the
data revealed few instances of missed events. Under emergency conditions, only two events
were missed. One of these involved not responding to a flight attendant who entered the
cockpit and the other, to an ATC call. Similady, only seven ATC calls and one dispatch call
were missed under normal conditions. In two of these instances, the pilots appeared to hear
the call and act on the information but failed to reply. These instances may reflect a more
casual approach to radio communication than would be found in operational flying. The only
similarity in the missed events was the frequency of talking; in four of the eight instances of a
missed event, the captain was talking. Casual inspection of the tapes indicated that several of
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the captains had a tendency to talk =through" radio communications, making it impossible for
the first officer to hear and respond to the calls.
Other Errors
The data give few indications of any performance errors. The lack of errors may be
attributed, at least in part, to the mews' fami_arity with the aircraft; no data were obtained from
pilots transitioning to the aircraft. Nevertheless, many errors are relatively subtle and may be
difficult to detect. This section describes some of the investigator's observations that are not
reflected in previous analyses.
One of the most striking features of the tapes is the number of times that pilots
question each other about the heading or altitude. Interpreting these questions may be
problematic because the question may not indicate that the pilot has forgotten the information:
these pilots may actually be using cockpit resource management (CRM) procedures to obtain
confirmation of a setting. Only a few instances were found in which a pilot cleady could not
remember a heading or altitude after being given a frequency change.
The data, however, do provide some indication of an informal approach to radio
communications in the simulator. For example, six ATC calls asked the crew if they had
received and understood the instructions, in another case, the crew did not give their call sign
during a transmission. Another crew failed to respond to ATC although they clearly heard the
transmission.
A few examples of operational errors were noted. One crew forgot to call the tower at
the outer marker. Another forgot to reset the altimeter after climbing through 18,000 ft.
Several crews forgot minor procedural items, like turning off the logo lights after climb out.
One first officer told a captain that they had received clearance to land although ATC had only
issued a clearance for the approach. Because no comparable data are available from revenue
flights, it is not possible to determine how the frequency of the observed errors compares to
their frequency in operational flying. The fact that such errors occur may testify to the realism
of the scenario or again, it may indicate a casual approach to training.
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SUMMARY
The major purpose of this study was to use patterns of internJptJons to determine the
priorities of vadous events and activities. The data demonstrate that most elements and
second-level activities are interrupted relatively infrequently, implying that they have a higher
priority than the events. Of the six types of events that were examined in this study (ATC
communications, appearance of the flight attendant, cabin chimes, voice communical_ons from
the cabin attendant, warning signals, and communications from support personnel).
communications from ATC and dispatch appeared to have the highest priority. Those
unfamiliar with air carder operations may be surprised at dispatch's relatively high priority.
However, in revenue operations dispatch usually conveys flight critical information. In the
three scenarios inr.Juded in this study, the pilots contacted dispatch after an emergency had
begun.
Events other than ATC calls occurred too infrequently in the three scenarios to allow
statistical analysis. Consequently, all subsequent conclusions pertain only to ATC
communications. One of the more surprising results of this study was that the probabirdy of
interruption for both elements and second-level activities did not differ under emergency as
compared to normal conditions except in two conditions, which showed opposite effects. This
lack of differences appears counterintuitive and may reflect the types of scenarios included in
this study; only one (smell of unknown origin) had the urgency usually associated with
emergencies. Thus, the lack of differences should be viewed with some skepticism until more
data can be collecting using other scenarios.
An equally puzzling result concerns the lack of significant differences in the probability
of interruption under dual- and single-task conditions for both elements and second-level
activities. Again, these results seem counterintuitive since multiple-task performance in air
carder operations is often associated with high workload and a sense of urgency. Such
conditions would appear to make the pilots less responsive to events. The most parsimonious
explanation of these results is low statistical powec very few events occurred while the pilots
were performing two elements or two second-level activities. Again. this result should be
viewed with some skepticism until more da_ can be collected.
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Perhaps the most interesting finding in this study concerned the high relative probability
of interruption for activities associated withoperating and programming the FMC as compared
to more traditional housekeeping and procedural activities. These results may provide some
insight into how errors are introduced into automated systems; investigators have observed the
results of programming errors but generally have not identified the mechanism by whiCh the
errors were introduced into the system. Interrupting FMC programming, particularly to respond
to ATC, may open a "window of opportunity" for error.
On the whole, the data showed r_le evidence of errors and reflect the expertise and
professionalism expected in air carrier operation. Training organizations, however, may wish to
review how they simulate ATC communications and emphasize communication procedures in
their recurrent ttairdng.
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